Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have Policymakers Discussed This Enough? by Sweet, Kathleen M.
Online Journal of Space Communication 
Volume 3 
Issue 6 Satellite Security (Winter 2004) Article 5 
June 2021 
Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have Policymakers Discussed 
This Enough? 
Kathleen M. Sweet 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal 
 Part of the Astrodynamics Commons, Navigation, Guidance, Control and Dynamics Commons, Space 
Vehicles Commons, Systems and Communications Commons, and the Systems Engineering and 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sweet, Kathleen M. (2021) "Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have Policymakers Discussed This 
Enough?," Online Journal of Space Communication: Vol. 3 : Iss. 6 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol3/iss6/5 
This Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the OHIO Open Library Journals at OHIO Open Library. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Online Journal of Space Communication by an authorized editor of OHIO Open 
Library. For more information, please contact deborded@ohio.edu. 
Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have Policymakers Discussed This 
Enough? 
Kathleen M. Sweet, J.D., Lt. Col. (Ret.) USAF  
Associate Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University  
August 2003  
 
Introduction 
Full spectrum dominance depends on the inherent strengths of modern space 
power-speed, global range, stealth, flexibility, precision, lethality, global theater 
situational awareness and strategic perspective.  
-Air Force White Paper, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air 
Force[1] 
Arguably, one of the most significant global security policy debates of the 21st 
century is whether the United States and more specifically the Bush 
Administration should develop and deploy space-based weaponry. The age of 
space is upon us. But how convinced is the rest of America, the West and 
potential adversaries of the legitimate need to do so? For almost half a century, 
the world's space powers have abstained from deploying such weapons as basic 
unwritten policy. To date, the military has been limited to surveillance, navigation 
and communications satellites. In June 2001, Former Air Force Chief of Staff, 
General Michael Ryan was quoted as saying, "Eventually we're going to have to 
have the capability to take things out in orbit."[2] 
 
His argument is based on the premise that historically, 
wherever commerce has gone so does US national 
interest and, subsequently, the requirement to protect 
that interest. This rationale for the deployment of 
offensive space weaponry should elicit much debate, especially as our military is 
reduced in size. Policymakers and institutions of higher learning need to address 
this issue before the "Final Frontier" becomes a battlefield. To neglect the topic 
and let the militarization of space happen out of apathy will be to relinquish any 
input over a decision, which could potentially destroy the planet. 
The technological revolution of the late twentieth century has provided the US 
military an incredible conventional offensive force and altered forever the way 
war can and will be waged. In March 2002, Paul Teets, Undersecretary of the Air 
Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the 
Pentagon's lead procurement officer for space programs, stated, "I believe that 
weapons will go into space. It's a question of time. And we need to be at the 
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forefront of that."[3] Teets has a significant baseline to work from to effectuate 
this concept. The advent of precision- guided munitions has provided war 
fighters, for example, with ordnance accuracies measured as Circular Errors of 
Probability (CEPs) on the order of a few feet. 
 
Newer weapons including laser guided bombs, Global 
Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions, and 
Tomahawk missiles have given military forces an 
immense capability that will assist in the defeat of any known enemy and, if used 
correctly, with minimum collateral damage and civilian casualties. Yet, this 
certainly is just the beginning of the revolution. The trend will be toward even 
more precise and lethal weapons systems, often unmanned or minimally manned, 
and able to respond within seconds to attack targets anywhere on earth. On this 
basis, space seems to offer significant advantages in future warfare, and, 
currently, the US government is actively pursuing research on spaced based laser 
and kinetic weapons. 
This paper will seek to provide some perspective on the necessity of such pursuits 
and the possible consequences of rushing in without thinking. The discussion will 
describe the types of offensive space-based weapons most likely to be developed 
and deployed in the early 21st Century as well as the potential impact on US 
military force structure, roles and missions, and doctrine. Clearly, the military has 
accepted that conflict in space is now inevitable and is preparing for it. The 
stabilizing or destabilizing impact on the world security environment, from an 
academic perspective, will also be addressed. 
Historical Developments 
Arguably, the militarization of space commenced with the launch of the Soviet 
Union's Sputnik satellite in 1957. In the early stages of the Cold War, both sides 
began competing in space to conquer and use space for the benefit of military 
forces. President Dwight Eisenhower's response to Sputnik was rather muted 
especially in relation to the public outcry over the event.  
 
He personally believed that the public's concern was 
unwarranted; failing thus to act quickly to equal the 
Soviet Union's effort, he ensured America's second place 
position in space for the near term.[4] More recently, the 
Clinton Administration's philosophy of a restrained 
approach has been replaced with the Bush 
Administration's unquestioning acceptance of 
exploitation of space for military purposes. 
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The separation of military and civilian space programs became codified in July 
1958 with the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which formally 
created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The US 
effort was focused toward peaceful scientific and commercial applications. Later, 
when President John F. Kennedy decided to engage in the race to place a man on 
the moon, the effort assumed a priority position and the military quickly 
recognized they were losing potential funding. 
Military efforts in space did exist and were supported and characterized as 
"peaceful" missions. The advent of reconnaissance satellites brought one of those 
peaceful missions to the forefront following the downing of a U-2 spy plane over 
the Soviet Union in May 1960. Officially, US space policy evolved from the 
advocacy of the non-military use of space to one of non-aggressive use of 
space.[5] 
In order to legally continue the programs, the US began to seek confirming 
international agreements. The idea was not new and incorporated Eisenhower's 
"Open Skies" initiative. The former Soviet Union rejected the entire concept to 
allow free over flights of each other's country to verify the location and numbers 
of nuclear weapons.[6] 
Even though the major powers were not in agreement, they continued to 
experiment but not deploy. Gradually both the Soviet Union and the US expanded 
military space programs but still restrained themselves from actively using 
technology capable of shooting down satellites from the ground, sea or air. 
Nonetheless, trepidation about Soviet threats to place nuclear weapons in orbit led 
Eisenhower to propose a ban on nuclear weapons in space as early as September 
1960. The Soviets agreed, which led to a bilateral agreement to ban nuclear 
weapons testing from outer space. Specifically, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial 
bodies; including the moon. 
Additionally, the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
systems banned either side form interfering with the other's spy satellites. Both of 
these important documents continue to have considerable influence on the current 
debate because both the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty served to 
reinforce the self-restraint on the deployment of military space weaponry that 
Eisenhower advanced. The end of the first Cold War precipitated a reevaluation 
of current policy. 
In the 1990's, National Security Council (NSC) Directive 5520, dated 26 May 
1995, recommended separating the US space effort from ongoing military 
programs to develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This directive 
worked to disengage the military from satellite development programs and 
diverted monies to ICBM programs. Six years later in April 2001, prior to 9/11, 
the Transformation Study Report, drafted for the Office of the Secretary of 
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Defense reasoned that, " Space capabilities are inherently global, unaffected by 
territorial boundaries or jurisdictional limitations; they provide direct access to all 
regions, and with our advanced technologies, give us a highly asymmetrical 
advantage over any potential adversary.[7] 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made clear that a key objective for 
the military in the 21st Century is not only to exploit space for military purposes 
but to make sure that the US maintains full spectrum dominance in space. Right 
after 9/11, Defense Secretary Donald A. Rumsfeld created a Policy coordinating 
committee for Space within the National Security Council, recognizing that the 
US is extremely dependent on space and arguably the dependency on 
communication and navigation networks needed to be protected. The 
Administration continues to formulate and implement its offensive spaced base-
based weapons initiatives without much scrutiny. 
Treaties and the Law of Space 
Emotions run high throughout diplomatic and political circles when the space 
treaties mentioned-above are debated. As is frequently the case, the difficulties 
arise in how world governments interpret the terminology contained in them. The 
exact wording of Article IV (1) of the 1967 Outer Space (hereinafter referred to as 
the 1967 Treaty), is: 
States party to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass 
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in 
outer space in any manner.[8] 
The article goes on to state that; "the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used 
by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes." 
Unfortunately, the inadequacy of the wording has caused heated debate in 
military, political, and scientific communities. "Peaceful purposes" apparently 
only applies to the "moon and other celestial bodies," not to earth orbit or "outer 
space" as used in the treaty. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit 
is clearly prohibited; yet, the definition of a weapon of mass destruction is not as 
specifically defined. It is assumed any nuclear, chemical or biological would meet 
the criteria. 
The 1972 ABM Treaty is also susceptible to varying interpretations depending on 
perspective. The debate began in 1983 after President Reagan's decision to start 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research and development. Article V (1) in the 
ABM Treaty states: 
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or 
components, which are sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based.[9] 
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Although deployment of a space-based missile defense system is in clear violation 
of Article V, Reagan hoped that by offering to share technology with the former 
Soviet Union, he could obtain an agreement to mutually nullify the treaty. 
Additionally, the ABM Treaty does not prevent research and development efforts 
as long as components are not tested. [10] How to exactly define "testing" is open 
to elucidation. On top of that, subcomponents can legally be tested compounding 
the definitional disputes as well as making definitions of what constitutes a 
component and what constitutes a sub-component a key area of disagreement.[11] 
Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, the US has renewed development 
and testing of anti-ballistic missile systems. These efforts include improvements 
in space-borne systems among three services: the Navy's upper tier as well as 
airborne and surface-based systems; the Air Force's Laser and Theater Anti-Air 
Defense System (THAAD); the Navy's lower tier and the Army's Patriot. 
Additional interpretations of the 1967 Treaty apply to the area of anti-satellite 
weapons applications as evidenced by the fact that the former Soviet Union 
developed an anti-satellite weapons system as early as 1968. This satellite 
interceptor program caused little unrest in the US primarily because testing had 
ceased in 1971, ostensibly as a result of easing tensions between the two 
countries. [12] Technically, anti-satellite weapons can be ground-based; thus, not 
space weapons, avoiding treaty disagreements. However, the technologies being 
developed today for anti-satellite weaponry can be applied to satellites in an 
offensive space control mode. Therefore, anti-satellite weapons may hasten the 
space-based deployment of offensive earth-attack weapons through dual usage of 
common technologies. 
Geopolitical, Military and Diplomatic Factors 
Today's military is increasingly dependent on reliable, and secure sets of space 
systems. The information revolution has reached into space. Ways to deny, 
disrupt, or alter information provided to the enemy is particularly sought after by 
the competent battlefield commander. Military policymakers, however, have so 
far been reluctant to risk interruption of commercially generated information 
flow. The increasing reliance by modern forces on precision-guided weapons 
relying on commercial GPS systems has created unusual dependence of a military 
on a business. 
Considering the current global situation, it is fair game to debate whether US 
space based assets are really at risk. Some have foretold of a "Space Pearl Harbor" 
but this seems a bit disingenuous. The Soviet Union had a working anti-satellite 
weapons system in the early 1970's and given adequate funding, modern Russia 
would be capable of building another more up-to date system. Our European 
allies could likely build and deploy an ASAT system but have also resisted 
spending the money to build one. Other countries with space potential include 
Brazil, China, India, and Iran. [13] To date, the perceived threat has not matched 
the enthusiasm to commit to the effort. 
5
Sweet: Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have Policymakers Discussed This E
Published by OHIO Open Library, 2021
The US has no active ASAT program but since 9/11 is more actively pursing the 
matter. The system would likely be ground-based initially and deployed sometime 
in the early decades of the 21st century. This system could be a precursor to an 
offensive weapon that would possess the capability to attack and destroy ground 
targets. This continuing activity begs the additional question of whether space 
should be weaponized and whether Congress is poised to fund the programs. 
Wary of the changes in the former Soviet states and the threat of global terrorism, 
it seems that they are willing. Congress realizes that the US military cannot be 
caught unprepared again in defense of the Homeland. Consequently, funding for 
research and development of technologies easily adapted to space warfare 
continues, despite reservations about weapons in space. 
The US does not have a monopoly on the use of space but does dominant it. The 
number of nations able to realistically challenge the US in space is limited. The 
Russian space program is still operates at an advanced level even though 
somewhat stagnant due to economic difficulties. China certainly has the potential 
to be a major space power in the 21st century. Other countries have launch 
facilities and technological prowess to pursue interests in space. How these space 
capable countries would react or be capable of significantly reacting to further US 
space superiority remains to be seen. Regardless, US strategists need to consider 
the possibilities. Should such a threat materialize, the US monopoly in space 
warfare would be eliminated, much as the atomic bomb monopoly was lost when 
the Soviet Union developed an atomic bomb. At least some analysts believe that 
strategy would cover aspects of space control, missile defense and force 
application from space. 
The financial costs could be prohibitive. Nonetheless, the Air Force alone is 
expected to invest $185 million in the areas of surveillance ad prevention during 
fiscal year 2003. More specifically, one official was quoted as saying, "Air Force 
Space Command is developing a concept of operations for space control and has 
launched a "red force" namely the 527th Space Aggressor Squadron to pinpoint 
vulnerabilities in US systems.[14] The military is progressing with plans to 
militarize and weaponize space on a steady, quiet basis even if not full steam 
ahead. Therefore, US policymakers must seriously consider the effect of US 
unilateral violation of current international space treaties. The US is the most 
powerful nation on earth and clearly capable of space superiority. The real 
question is whether or not it is worth it politically, diplomatically and 
economically to take such steps. 
Space Weapons 
By 2025 it is very likely that space will be to the air as air to the cavalry today. 
-Air Force 2025: America's Vigilant Edge 
In general, technological innovations in air and space will maintain a 
revolutionary pace well into the 21st century. The technical pathway of what can 
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be accomplished given enough resources and political will versus what should be 
accomplished is a process constantly in transition. Technical difficulties that 
seemed almost insurmountable a decade ago are being conquered today somewhat 
routinely and on a regular basis. Plans to move out into space have been on the 
drawing boards for years. Paralleling advancements in the general area of air and 
space are developmental plans regarding space based offensive weapons. 
Satellite Systems Developments 
Two technological impediments to space offensive weapons deployment serve as 
the greatest challenge to date. They fall into two categories: space launch 
technologies and high power generation systems. Space launch systems are very 
expensive and limit the size of the space cargo able to be transported. Lift in the 
US is particularly expensive, hence commercial satellite provider's usage of 
Baikenour in Kazakhstan and other launch facilities in China. Power requirements 
to operate satellites tactically, i.e., to move them from low orbits to high, 
necessitate enormous amounts of energy. High power generation systems are 
needed to fire and maintain weapons that use high-energy lasers, thereby avoiding 
frequent and costly re-fuelling. 
Considerable interest has developed in devices to decrease the size of future space 
platforms and ease the space lift requirements. These tiny devices, called 
microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), numbering many thousand to a 
standard computer microchip, will be able to sense heat, light, motion and sound 
and can be used in a number of space applications including control of reflective 
mirror surfaces in space-based laser systems.[15] In discussing power generation 
systems, one cannot overlook the potential use of nuclear power in space, 
especially for long-term power requirements. Power beaming technologies, 
transmitting power through ground-based lasers to satellites, may be 
technologically feasible and would be more politically appealing.[16] They would 
also represent a tempting target. 
Each weapon system that is developed and deployed will require a complete 
"system of systems" architecture approach for the design.[17] Each weapon will 
be associated with its interconnected surveillance, acquisition, tracking and battle 
damage assessment system for a complete stand-alone capability.[18] These 
constellations of satellites will be less susceptible to attack because a single attack 
will not disable the entire system.[19] Several of these constellations, in low earth 
orbit, can provide global, full-time coverage. Two basic types of weapons systems 
are being touted as the most realistically achievable: high-powered lasers and 
kinetic weapons. 
Lasers 
High-powered chemical lasers have been developed and tested for years, initially 
for missile defense systems. Over time, these weapons have undergone significant 
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improvements in optics, power generation, beam control, miniaturization, and 
other key factors.[20] In the next thirty years, a prototype system could be 
developed that will allow global engagement of targets in minutes or seconds 
anywhere in the world. 
Chemical oxygen-iodine lasers (COILs) have been produced that also have 
weapons applications. The US Air Force will use this type of laser in the Airborne 
Laser (ABL) system. This system, designed for ballistic missile defense, will soon 
reach operational capability. The disadvantages of the ABL, the requirement to be 
airborne in the area of operations during expected attack by ballistic missile, is 
precisely what makes a space-based laser a desirable achievement. A space-based 
laser system would provide constant coverage if enough constellations were 
deployed. 
The power density (fluence) or the energy density (irradiance) achieved on target 
as measured in kilojoules per square centimeter or in watts per centimeter 
determines the lethality of the weapon. The power radiated by the laser and the 
size of the spot on the target affects this density. The smaller the spot size with a 
given quantity of energy irradiating the target, the greater the lethality of the 
weapon. Against satellite targets, lower amounts of energy would be required due 
to the short time of irradiation and the lack of atmospheric interference. Typical 
irradiance levels required for surface targets range from 100 to 10,000 watts/cm2; 
for satellites, 1 to 10 watts/cm2 is sufficient to achieve target kill.[21] 
Effective focusing of the laser's beam is a primary consideration in weapons 
design. Because the same amount of energy is contained in the beam, a larger spot 
size equates to lesser irradiance and thus less lethality. To improve the beam 
focusing, various technologies will have to be developed such as large lightweight 
optics, adaptive optics using MEMS, or arrays of solid-state diode lasers.[22] All 
of these improvements are currently being funded and researched. 
Chemical lasers will likely later be supplanted by solid-state diode pumped lasers 
(SSDPLs). Power levels of these new types of lasers have been attained in the 
kilowatt range. Advances in production will lower the cost of these lasers and will 
lead to megawatt scale high-energy lasers of a compact nature for use in space-
based applications. There are no apparent technical limitations on power level for 
these lasers. Current developments indicate the potential of arrays of diode lasers 
becoming the weapons of choice for space applications.[23] 
Lasers are not, however, all weather systems. Clouds, rain, and atmospheric 
effects can scatter the laser's beam and require an increased power output to 
compensate. Large optics are also required; the size is dependent upon the 
frequency of the laser output and the range to the target. For the frequencies of 
laser systems currently under development, a 20-meter diameter optical system 
will be required for a satellite in low earth orbit.[24] 
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Lasers are extremely flexible weapons in that the amount of lethality can be 
controlled by the duration of the pulse and the power of irradiation. Thus, at high 
power levels and long duration (several seconds), burn through and target 
destruction can be achieved. At lower power levels, electronic degradation, 
melting, infrared sensor blinding, and target designations for laser-guided 
weapons can be produced. Flammable materials will catch fire under fairly low 
irradiation levels making targets such as gasoline refineries tempting. 
Several methods provide defense against the efforts of lasers. Covering targets 
with a reflective or ablative fire resistant coating will lessen the heat buildup on 
surfaces. Protective coatings on missile launch sites, radar and electronic 
equipment may forestall laser attacks. Another potential countermeasure takes 
advantage of the fact that lasers will not penetrate through layers of earth, making 
hardened and buried targets safe. 
Moving targets are not safe, especially if the acquisition and targeting systems are 
interconnected with the weapon in real time. Lasers can destroy targets in seconds 
from activation making even supersonic aircraft vulnerable. Lasing of fuel tanks 
or external weapons will explode the aircraft. 
High-powered lasers have already proven effective in providing cruise missile 
defense and downing ballistic missiles in boost phase. Once high power 
generation technology advances are made and miniaturization techniques are 
employed easing the space lift burden, space laser weapons should be readily 
available for production and deployment. 
Kinetic Weapons 
Kinetic weapons are missiles or other types of projectiles launched from space-
based platforms and either guided by GPS or laser designator. They destroy the 
target by attaining hypersonic speeds and shattering it with an enormous force. 
This type of weapon has the projected capability of destroying targets buried 
hundreds of feet underground.[25] Again, space based kinetic weapons would 
provide yet another tempting target for an adversary. 
Kinetic weapons have the potential to be extremely accurate with GPS terminal 
guidance, similar to current day precision guided munitions but without 
explosives. They have great destructive potential due to the speeds that they 
obtain. Single targets or multiple targets can be attacked depending on the type of 
projectile employed.[26] Unlike lasers, they will be all-weather weapons, capable 
of being launched from satellites and striking targets anywhere on earth in a 
matter of minutes. 
Kinetic weapons will not require the power generation equipment that high-
powered lasers will. This gives them a distinct advantage. Interconnectivity with 
surveillance, acquisition, and targeting satellites in a system architecture will, like 
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laser, create a potent weapon system. The distributive nature of the constellation 
approach to satellite weaponry will allow less susceptibility to anti-satellite 
attacks. Other stealthy approaches to manufacture will also aid in defense. 
The main problem with kinetic weapons is the fact that they generate lots of heat 
upon reentry. This can seriously degrade the electronic GPS receiver for terminal 
guidance. The use of a laser beam to lead the projectile through the atmosphere, 
creating a bow wave to partially shield it is one potential cure.[27] Defense 
against kinetic weapons is nearly impossible once the weapon has been launched. 
Anti-satellite weapons to eliminate the satellite before it launches or disruption of 
GPS service appear to be the only defensive measures to prevent kinetic attack. 
Of course, neither of these have the capability to prevent a preemptive strike 
making them rather vulnerable.[28] 
The technology to allow kinetic strikes is available today. Thus, in the future, 
advancement in technology will allow even greater accuracies and destructive 
power. This technology has some very appealing attributes for future space 
weaponry. 
Strategy and Doctrine 
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not 
upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur. 
-Guilio Douhet 
Military commanders are expected to limit the loss of troops and equipment in 
modern warfare. Precision guided munitions and stealth technologies provide an 
invaluable tool in such an effort. Historically, weapons like the Tomahawk 
missile have helped eliminate the need for aviators to attack through enemy air 
defenses, reducing exposure to hostile fire and protecting the pilot and jet. By all 
estimates, war in the future will be even more technologically oriented with little 
direct confrontation. 
Commanders, isolated from the danger of the battlefield, will employ unmanned 
systems to execute surveillance, target and destroy the enemy. Offensive space 
weapons will improve the commander's ability to protect and defend with less 
loss. Space weapons will also have a true global reach. This will clearly impact 
peacetime military roles and combat planning. US national security strategy needs 
to be specific in the appropriate application of such systems should they ever be 
deployed. Assuming that the decision to deploy offensive spaced based weapons 
is a foregone conclusion, military strategy and doctrine must be adapted 
accordingly. 
Doctrine in Peacetime 
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The primary peacetime manifesto for these weapons will be deterrence. The 
potential destructiveness will at first be questionable, but will no doubt give US 
adversaries reason to ponder nonetheless. Unfortunately, out of sheer mistrust 
they are likely to pursue efforts to combat a perceived threat, whatever allegedly 
positive US intentions for use of the weapons might be. 
Additionally, since these weapons will be susceptible to anti-satellite technology, 
it will be tempting for the US to preemptively strike anti-satellite production 
facilities and launch sites of any adversary. The collateral damage from these 
weapons may also be so small as to favor these preemptive strikes because 
negative international reaction will be at a minimum as long as damage is 
contained and personnel casualties are low. This is quite different from the 
previous philosophy of avoidance of military action in peacetime unless directly 
attacked.[29] Of course, the goal of avoiding preemption has already been 
circumvented by military action in Iraq. 
Deployment of offensive satellite systems, especially in peacetime, will 
automatically generate international reaction. Nations who have rivalries with the 
US, whether economic or military, will find it necessary to try to develop 
countermeasures and defensive systems. In some cases, countermeasures are 
currently on the drawing board but limited because steps areexpensive to design 
and build. The US monopoly on the deployment of these weapons would likely be 
temporary at best. The primary threat to the US domination of space, anti-satellite 
weapons, would have to be frequently monitored and upgrades would constantly 
be needed. 
Once deployed, the presence of space weapons may not have a great deterrent 
effect. To date, the quantity of destructive power is not available to seriously 
disable aggressive actions before they start. The mere presence of lethal 
equipment has not historically impeded an aggressor's actions and there's no 
reason to believe an unseen weapon in space would have any effect, particular one 
without major potential for total devastation. 
Doctrine in War 
Wartime use of space weapons will be multi-faceted and immediate. As part of a 
strategic campaign against an enemy nation, space weapons will be able to attack 
anywhere within seconds. This will make nearly any military or civilian target 
that has not previously been protected subject to destruction. Specific targets 
might include intelligence headquarters, electric power grids, communication 
nodes, leadership, command bunkers, dams, roads, bridges, buried ammunition 
bunkers, and energy facilities, but anything would be vulnerable. The pinpoint 
precision and impact within seconds sends a strong psychological signal to an 
enemy.[30] Consequently, with such destructive ability comes the responsibility 
to act and plan conscientiously. 
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Tactical targets can be attacked directly from space. Due to the quick reaction and 
speed of laser weapons, tanks, aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, helicopters, 
and ships, nearly any surface-based military target can be engaged and destroyed. 
Ships at sea will no longer be immune from attack in any part of the ocean. 
Eventually, nations will need to control space in order to control the sea, air or the 
land. 
Such envious capability will be why space will become the main battleground 
once US space monopoly ends. The battle for control of space will be the total 
war. Anti-satellite weapons will be used extensively to eliminate the earth attack 
satellite systems. Anti-satellite weapons would have to be developed and 
deployed to counter the enemy space control weapons. The never-ending cycle 
will drive a continuous arms race in space. 
Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Space Doctrine, assigns force application and space control 
as primary space missions. Force application will include attacking airborne and 
terrestrial targets and possibly missile defense. These will be the primary missions 
of a future "Airspace Force." At a conference in Huntsville Alabama in 2002, J-5 
Vice Director of US Space Command admitted that the command is directly 
responsible for this type of mission. The type of global reach described has not 
been seen before. Although, stealthy B-2 bombers can apply precise force 
anywhere in the world, the time to get there is not comparable to the speed of 
delivery from space. 
Stealth is never absolute. Conventional Tomahawk and air-launched cruise 
missiles will become obsolete. Space control will be a second primary mission, 
defined as the ability to assure freedom of action in space and deny the same to 
the enemy. This translates into an ability to defend US space assets from space. 
US policymakers have put the task in the hands of the US Space Command. 
However, the US Army has addressed the issue as well. They are concerned that 
such space based capabilities will negate the current advantage they possess by 
the use of satellite imagery, communications and precision targeting. 
The New Strategy 
To assess the impact of offensive space weapons on military strategy in the 21st 
Century, one must look at history. After World War I, many in the fledgling US 
Army Air Service and elsewhere throughout the world were expounding the 
theory of air power. Strategic bombing of cities was presumed to eliminate the 
enemy's will to fight bringing all future conflicts to a rapid conclusion. Guilio 
Douhet proclaimed that the side who had control of the air would win the next 
war. Billy Mitchell proved how air power would master the air above the sea as 
well as land by sinking the German battleship Ostfriesland from the air in 
1921.[31] The obvious conclusion was that land and sea forces were no longer 
needed. Air power had arrived. But like many new innovations, its promise was 
well beyond its ability to deliver. 
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Another revolutionary weapon introduced at the end of World War II, the atomic 
bomb, demonstrated the dominant role air power would play. Many now believe 
these weapons showed, as Mitchell had predicted, that air power would eliminate 
the need for conventional military forces. Nuclear attack would decide all future 
wars. The fear of nuclear annihilation kept the two superpowers from engaging in 
a conventional military confrontation and "mutually assured destruction." Real 
deterrence had arrived. 
The argument for a space force that will reduce or eliminate the need for other 
surface or air forces generates similar claims. Space-based weapons, responding 
in seconds, penetrating anywhere on earth, always available, flexible and lethal, 
can become the new weapon of choice to control and end conflict and prevent 
through the fear of attack any aggression on the part of our enemies. On the other 
end, they can kill us all; especially if nuclear. 
In reality, nuclear weapons have not eliminated the need for a robust conventional 
weapons capability to include navies and armies; and it is likely space-based 
offensive weapons will not either. Generally, dream usage of new weapon 
systems do not often materialize as expected. Ultimately, war is reduced, and 
some would argue always reduced, to man versus man, the essence of human 
confrontation. 
History has shown also that the ability to attack from more than one direction or 
dimension using more than one weapons system has been a valuable force 
multiplier. Although space weapons may be a formidable asset to the Joint Force 
Commander, a commander will still rely more conventional "tools in the regular 
toolbox" weapons systems. 
Currently, space weapons do not have the destructive power of nuclear weapons 
unless they themselves are nuclear. Such deployment of nuclear weapons in space 
is particularly confrontational and should definitely not be pursued unless some 
truly remarkable circumstances somehow arise. Therefore, space weapons 
become just another conventional precision attack weapon. They will continue to 
be an augmentation to other weapons, not a replacement. Nuclear military 
strategy is unlikely to be affected. 
Although space weapons may have a role in future conflict at sea, peacetime 
presence and crisis response missions, including Marine Corps contingency 
operations are not likely to disappear. The Navy will have a viable and significant 
role to play in this arena. Aircraft carriers, as the showpiece of American 
diplomacy and the center of crisis response operations, will still be a viable and 
reliable tool; but strategists will need to consider defending them appropriately. 
Simply put, there will be nowhere to hide. 
Ground combat operations will be needed for the same reasons they are utilized 
today - permanent conflict termination. Without ground forces present inside the 
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enemy nation, the end of war may not be affected on the term desired by the US 
political leadership regardless of how difficult it often is to win the peace. Army 
forces will remain the final tool in US power diplomacy. The Air Force may have 
expanded roles in the control of space but will, politics aside, not delete any of its 
current airborne missions and rely solely on space-based offensive weapons. 
Close air support and air reinforcement operations will serve the same functions 
they have in the past and the long range bombing option will still provide an 
alternative choice. 
Space control warfare, with anti-satellite missions in prominence, will impact 
future strategy and planning. Information technology and the data received and 
heavily relied upon by field commanders, provided today to the commander from 
satellites, may be interrupted. Back-up systems will have to be developed, 
possibly using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) able to provide real-time 
surveillance, intelligence, and targeting information in lieu of satellites or the old 
fashioned way. 
Revolutionary changes in the conduct of war in the next century cannot solely be 
predicted based on the presence of space offensive weapons. As a force 
multiplier, they can be a significant asset to a commander due to their quick 
reaction, measured lethality, and global availability. Kinetic weapons will have an 
added capability to destroy deeply buried command or ammunition bunkers. 
Regardless, as a significant factor in influencing the outcome of a conflict and in 
totally eliminating the need for other more conventional weapons, they will not 
alter the status quo, just enhance it. 
Anti-satellite weapons will have a significant place in future military planning. 
Using the same kinds of technologies described, whether space-based or ground-
based, the US space control mission will eventually be expanded. The US 
historically has resisted up until the current Administration, placing any anti-
satellite weapons systems in operation. The expectation is still that this system 
will remain ground-based. However, a space-based system could easily be 
developed as the logical follow-on to the ground-based one. 
Another likely scenario to begin space weaponization would be the first space-
based anti-ballistic missile defensive system, consisting of some type of laser. 
This system would be the obvious follow-on to the Airborne Laser program. 
Because President Reagan gave the impetus to ballistic missile defense in the 
1980's, before the fall of the Communist governments in the former Soviet Union, 
and because of the evil publicity engendered by Saddam Hussein's use of Scud 
missiles during Desert Storm, the public support for such a program will likely be 
fairly positive. 
Both of these weapons system development programs are likely scenarios for the 
beginning of the militarization of space, which could open the door for further 
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offensive weapons development and deployment. The future of space, beyond the 
information age, is likely to be warfare. 
Conclusion 
A new set of rules for the conduct of war will have to be devised and a whole new 
set of ideas of strategy learned by those charged with the conduct of war. 
-Brig. General Billy Mitchell, USA (1925) 
The US could be the first nation to break the international self-imposed 
moratorium on placing offensive weapons in space. The American public's sense 
of fair play that the US always abides by the rules in international conduct will 
suffer a setback, although no treaties would be broken. But it is likely that the US 
public will support defensive weaponry, such as anti-satellite systems, especially 
since 9/11. Unilateral arming of space will cause a credibility problem with US 
allies around the world. However, the current administration hasn't seemed too 
concerned in this regard. 
The US cannot afford the exorbitant financial expenditure of space weaponization 
at this time. The US must do all it can to avoid a space war. The optimum way to 
do this will be to ban anti-satellite weapons. However, this will not by itself 
eliminate the threat from space. Space-based anti-ballistic missile systems are 
likely to also be produced which can easily be transformed into ground attack 
systems. 
The US must consider and define the gains, if any, from the unilateral deployment 
of offensive space weapons. Less costly and equally effective systems for anti-
ballistic missile defense exist or can be developed that are ground-based or 
airborne. The commercial use of space is extensive; especially in the domain of 
communications. Opening space up to potential conflict would devastate 
American industrial and commercial activities. Simply put, denying the West 
access to commercial communications satellites would bring all our economies to 
their knees in very short order. 
The questions to be answered by US policymakers and military planners can be 
consolidated into three significant issues. First, will the US be able to afford these 
systems and are they worth the investment? Secondly, will US arrogance expect 
other nations to refrain from matching US efforts in space once the US breaks the 
moratorium? Thirdly, will offensive space weapons threaten the stability of the 
world? 
These questions have no simple answers. Many would argue that it is time to ban 
all weapons in space. They compare this decision to the one made in abandoning 
pursuit of a neutron bomb. However, the pursuit of technological advancement 
will continue and the military has the responsibility to continue to develop better 
weaponry in order to stay ahead of potential competitors. Conflict between 
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competing nations is not likely to end soon and has existed since time 
immemorial. Finding a more effective way to prepare and to win the next war is 
an obligation not a theory. The US must lead and, as the scouts say, be prepared. 
There is no question that protection of space assets, including but not limited to 
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